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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20140749-CA
JAMES RAPHAEL SANCHEZ,
Appellant is incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION

James' s opening brief raises two issues. First, it argues that the trial court
reversibly erred when it excluded evidence James proffered under Rule 106 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. Second, it argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
James's conviction for obstructing justice. In response, the State contends that the trial
court did not reversibly err when it denied James's Rule 106 proffer and that the evidence
was sufficient to support the obstructing justice conviction. For the reasons set forth in
the opening brief and in this reply brief, the State is incorrect. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c)
("Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing

brief.").
ARGUMENT

I. Under Rule 106, the trial court was required to admit the part of James's
statement to Reyes in which he explained why he assaulted Angela because it
was necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the part of the
statement in which James admitted to the assault. The court's exclusion of the

evidence was prejudicial because it precluded James from presenting his
theory of the case.
James's opening brief explains that the trial court reversibly erred when, under
Rule 106, it excluded the part of James's statement to Reyes in which he explained that
he assaulted Angela because she repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with
his brother. Appellant's Br. 8-20. The State disagrees. It argues that Rule 106 is not an
exception to the hearsay rule; that, even if Rule 106 is an exception to the hearsay rule,
the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence; and that, even if the trial court erred,
the error was not prejudicial. Appellee's Br. 17-46. The State is mistaken.

i

Ci;

A. Rule 106 is an exception to the hearsay rule.
In Utah and many other jurisdictions, Rule 106 operates as an exception to the
hearsay rule. In State v. Leleae, this Court held that "Rule 106 applied to allow
introduction of defendant's entire statement ... to put the prosecution's selected portions
in context." State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ,f46, 993 P.2d 232. The defendant's entire
statement in that case included parts that would have otherwise constituted inadmissible

4v.
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hearsay. See id. ,I39. Thus, under Leleae, Rule 106 operates as an exception to the

"

hearsay rule. Contra Appellee's Br. 30.

I
I

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "Rule 106 codifies in
part the common law 'rule of completeness,' which permits introduction of an otherwise

inadmissible statement if the opposing party introduces a portion of the statement." State
v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, 1[40, 345 P.3d 195 (emphasis added); accord State v. Cruz-Meza,
2003 UT 32, 1[9, 76P.3d1165; Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 1[43. Rule 106 could not
2

partially codify the common law rule of completeness unless it also permitted evidence
that would otherwise be inadmissible. See Jones, 2015 UT 19, iJ40; Utah R. Evid. 106.
Similarly, the doctrine of oral completeness contained in Rule 611 operates as a hearsay
~

exception, Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,r,r1, 6-7, 9-15, and "the introduction of statements
under the doctrine of oral completeness should be more narrowly confined than the
introduction of statements under [R]ule 106." Id. ,I13. It would stand to reason, then, that
Rule 106 also operates as a hearsay exception. Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has
indicated that the fairness standard of Rule 106 adequately addresses "any constitutional

~

concerns with selective admission of [written or recorded] statements by criminal
defendants." Id. ,II 7. This would not be possible unless Rule 106 allowed defendants to
present otherwise inadmissible statements that are necessary to correct an unfair
depiction of their statements.
Many other jurisdictions hold that their version of Rule 106 is a hearsay exception.
See, e.g., United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Peculiarly, the

Government maintains that the purview of Rule 106 is limited to the order of proof. To
the contrary, our case law unambiguously establishes that the rule of completeness may
be invoked to facilitate the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence."); United
States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Rule 106 can adequately fulfill

its function only by permitting the admission of some otherwise inadmissible evidence
when the court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence should be considered
contemporaneously."); United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that federal Rule 106 makes admissible "otherwise inadmissible evidence" that
3

is "necessary to correct a misleading impression"); Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 814
{Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (stating that "Texas Rule of Evidence 107, known as the rule of
optional completeness," is a "recognized exception to the hearsay rule"); People v. Vines,
251 P.3d 943,968 (Cal. 2011) (describing California's analogue to Rule 106 as a
"hearsay exception"); State v. Keith, 618 A.2d 291,293 (N.H. 1992) {"Although Rule
106 is not an automatic rule of admissibility, ... we have held that a trial court may
admit otherwise inadmissible evidence to counter a misleading advantage if a party has
'opened the door' to such evidence."); accord United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d
716, 735-36 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Even if the fact allocution would be subject to a hearsay
objection, that does not block its use when it is needed to provide context for a statement
already admitted."); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 187 (3d Cir.
1993) ("Nor was Williams' hearsay testimony admissible under a related exception,
sometimes referred to as the principle of completeness.").
The D.C. Circuit has eloquently explained why federal Rule 106 is a hearsay
exception, and that explanation is equally applicable to Rule 106. See Sutton, 801 F.2d at
1368. "The structure of the [Utah] Rules of Evidence indicates that Rule 106 is concerned
with more than merely the order of proof Rule 106 is found not in Rule 611, which
governs the 'Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation,' but in Article I, which
contains rules that generally restrict the manner of applying the exclusionary rules.
Moreover, every major rule of exclusion in the [Utah] Rules of Evidence contains the
proviso, 'except as otherwise provided by these rules,' which indicates 'that the
draftsmen knew of the need to provide for relationships between rules and were familiar
4

with a technique for doing this.' There is no such proviso in Rule 106, which indicates
that Rule 106 should not be so restrictively construed." Id. (citations and footnotes
omitted). Therefore, "Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the
admission of some otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that
the proffered evidence should be considered contemporaneously. A contrary construction
raises the specter of distorted and misleading trials, and creates difficulties for both
litigants and the trial court." Id.
Relying heavily on quotes from non-Utah cases, the State gives a lengthy
exposition on the general inadmissibility of exculpatory hearsay and then cursorily
concludes that Rule 106 ought not operate as an exception to it. Appellee's Br. 30-33. In
essence, the State's argument is that exculpatory hearsay statements aren't trustworthy,
so they shouldn't be admissible under Rule 106. Id. But our supreme court has said that
"trustworthiness" is a "consideration absent from [R]ule 106." Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32,
114. Under Rule 106, fairness is the overriding concern: one party should not be able to
gain an unfair advantage by taking words out of context. Indeed, fairness must be the
overriding concern if Rule 106 is able to adequately prevent "any potential [due process]
problem" with using a defendant's written or recorded statements against him. Jd.117.
Furthermore, the State takes the quotes it relies on out of context. It creates the
impression that the quotes come from cases explaining why Rule 106 is not a hearsay
exception. See Appellee's Br. 32-33. But they don't. All of the quotes are actually from
cases explaining why exculpatory hearsay statements are generally inadmissible. None of
the quotes concerns whether Rule 106 is an exception to the general hearsay rule.
5

Compare Appellee's Br. 31-33, with Lily v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 132 (1999),
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994), United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d
675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000), State v. Brooks, 909 S.W.2d 854, 863 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. 1995),

and State v. Fernandez, 604 A.2d 1308, 1313 (Conn. Ct. App. 1992). The cases cited by
the State holding that Rule 106 is not a hearsay exception do so without explanation.

United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 134 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Collicott, 92
F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996); U.S. Football League v. Nat'/ Football League, 842 F.2d
1335, 1375-76 (2d Cir. 1988).
The State argues that if Rule 106 is a hearsay exception, the "'door would be
thrown open to obvious abuse: an accused could create evidence for himself by making
statements in his favor for subsequent use at his trial to show his innocence.'" Appellee's
Br. 33 (quoting Brooks, 909 S. W.2d at 863 (explaining why exculpatory hearsay
statements are generally inadmissible)). But Rule 106 allows a defendant to introduce his
exculpatory statements only when they are '"necessary to qualify, explain, or place into
context"' his inculpatory statements which have already been introduced by the State.

Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, iJ14. In other words, Rule 106 only allows defendants to prevent
the State from unfairly using their words against them. Properly understood, Rule 106
carries no potential for abuse. The State ignores the immense potential for obvious abuse
if Rule 106 were not a hearsay exception: the State could secure unfair and unreliable
convictions by taking defendants' words out of context. Moreover, the Utah Supreme
Court has already dismissed the State's notion of "'"making evidence for himself''" as a
"'question-begging fallacy."' State v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 215,216 n.1 (Utah 1983).
6

Again, it is telling that the Connecticut and Tennessee cases quoted by the State
don't even address whether Rule 106 is a hearsay exception. See Appellee's Br. 32-33
(quoting Brooks, 909 S.W.2d at 863; Fernandez, 604 A.2d at 1313). Instead, they only
address the general inadmissibility of exculpatory hearsay. Brooks, 909 S.W.2d at 863;

Fernandez, 604 A.2d at 1313. What's more: both Connecticut and Tennessee hold that
Rule 106 is a hearsay exception. State v. Jackson, 777 A.2d 591, 602 (Conn. 2001) ("Our
cases have long held that, when one party to a litigation or prosecution seeks to introduce
admissions that constitute only a portion of a conversation, the opposing party may
introduce other relevant portions of the conversation, irrespective of whether they are

self-serving or hearsay." (emphasis added)); State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Tenn.
2000) (holding that Tennessee's Rule 106 is a hearsay exception because "it would not be
consistent with fundamental fairness to allow the prosecution to introduce only the most
incriminating portions of a defendant's statement without regard to the overall context or

relevant exculpatory portions found in the same statement" (emphasis added)). The
State's reliance on cases from those jurisdictions is sorely misplaced.
The State also says that if Rule 106 is a hearsay exception, a defendant would
"'never want to testify' because he could 'make evidence in his favor at his pleasure."'
Appellee's Br. 32. This statement implies that courts should interpret evidence rules with
an eye toward pressuring defendants to waive their constitutional right not to testify. This
implication obviously runs contrary to our system of justice. See Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,229 (1973) ('"It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."').
7

Moreover, as explained above, Rule 106 does not allow defendants to '"make evidence in
[their] favor at [their] pleasure"'; it only allows them to prevent the State from unfairly
using their words against them. And again, the Utah Supreme Court has rejected the
State's "'question-begging fallacy about "making evidence for himself.""' Johnson, 671
P.2d at 216 n.l.
In asking this Court to hold that Rule 106 is not a hearsay exception, the State
might be overlooking the fact that Rule 106 is available to all litigants in criminal and
civil cases. See Utah R. Evid. 106. If there hasn't already, there will likely come a casewhether civil or criminal-where the State wants to use Rule 106 as a means to introduce
otherwise inadmissible hearsay. See State v. Prasertphong, 114 P.3d 828, 829-30 (Ariz.
2005). The State would do well to heed the old aphorism, "Be careful what you wish
for."
B. Rule 106 required the trial court to admit the exculpatory portions ofJames 's
statement to Reyes to qualify, explain, and put into context the inculpatory
portions ofthe statement.

"If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement," Rule 106
permits "the adverse party" to "require the introduction, at that time, of any other partor any other writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered at the
same time." Utah R. Evid. 106. In other words, Rule 106 allows a party to introduce parts
of a written or recorded statement that are "relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, and
place into context" parts that have been introduced by the opposing party. Leleae, 1999
UT App 368, if43 (internal quotation marks omitted). James gave a statement to Reyes in
which he admitted committing the assault that caused Angela's death (admission) and
8

explained that he did it because she told him she was cheating on him with his brother
and refused to say she would end the affair (explanation). The State introduced James's
admission, but the trial court excluded his explanation. The admission, without the
explanation, created the misleading impression that James admitted to conduct that
constituted murder. But with the explanation, the jury may have found that James
admitted committing extreme emotional distress manslaughter rather than murder.
Therefore, James's explanation was obviously "necessary to qualify, explain, and place
into context" his admission. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 143 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The State's claim to the contrary is without merit. See Appellee's Br. 33-41.
This case presents precisely the type of situation Rule 106 contemplates.
Nobody-not the State, not a criminal defendant, not a civil litigant-should be able gain
an unfair advantage by taking statements out of context. It is especially repugnant when
the State gains an unfair advantage by taking words out of context in a criminal case, as
the result is an unfair and unreliable conviction. See State v. Akok, 2015 UT App 89, 113,
348 P.3d 377 ('"In our judicial system, the prosecution's responsibility is that of a
..)

minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate, which includes a duty to see that
the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of
sufficient evidence."'); United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[I]t

.J

is axiomatic that the Government has a duty to conduct a fair trial. ... [T]he
Government's efforts to execute this obligation should be at least as active as its zeal to
)

secure convictions."). "An admission depicts the party in its own words; [James] was
entitled to have the jury see those words rather than a precis that the [State] thought
9

would depict [him] in the worst light." Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d
183, 187 (7th Cir. 1993).
The State seems to believe that an explanation for conduct does not qualify,
explain, or place into context an admission to the conduct. See Appellee's Br. 36 (arguing
that James' s statements "regarding why he engaged in the conduct" were not necessary to
'"qualify, explain, or place into context' Detective Reyes'[s] testimony concerning what
[James]'s conduct was"). This is obviously incorrect where, as here, the explanation
could affect the legal significance of the admitted conduct. For example, imagine a
defendant said to a detective, "I punched the alleged victim because he attacked me with
a knife." On the State's view, the part of the statement about the alleged victim's knife
attack does not qualify, explain, or place into context the part about the defendant's
punch. See Appellee' s Br. 36. But this is clearly wrong. With the part about the knife
attack, the defendant admitted to acting in self-defense, whereas without it, it would
misleadingly appear that he confessed to assault. Thus, the part of the statement about the
knife attack changes the legal significance of the part about the punch. The State's
position is that it would be free to present the part about the punch while keeping out the
part about the knife attack. This position runs contrary to longstanding legal precedent
and fundamental notions of fairness. See State v. Dunkley, 39 P.2d 1097, 1109 (Utah
l

1935) ("[W]here the statement contains both disserving and self-serving statements, the
whole must be admitted and considered by the jury."); Keough, 18 S.W.3d at 182
("Indeed, it would not be consistent with fundamental fairness to allow the prosecution to

10

introduce only the most incriminating portions of a defendant's statement without regard
to the overall context or relevant exculpatory portions found in the same statement.").
The State argues that Rule 106 did not require the admission of James's
explanation because the explanation was "self-serving," "unreliable," and "hearsay."
Appellee's Br. 33-39. But reliability, i.e., "trustworthiness," is a "consideration absent
from [R]ule 106." 1 Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32,114. Under Rule 106, the reliability of an
exculpatory statement is a consideration for the jury, not the court. See id.; Dunkley, 39
P.2d at 1109; State v. Martin, 300 P. 1034, 1038 (Utah 1931). Moreover, as explained
above, Rule 106 is an exception to the hearsay rule. See supra Part I.A. And "[t]here is no
legal principle which excludes statements or conduct of a party solely on the ground they
are self-serving. If otherwise admissible, a party has as much right to his own evidence as
to the evidence of any other witness." State v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 215,216 (Utah 1983).
Rule 106 requires the admission of "self-serving" hearsay statements in limited
circumstances that apply here. See Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1109; supra Part I.A; see also
Utah R. Evid. 106 ("If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an

adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or any other
writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time."
(emphasis added)).
The State claims that Rule 106's fairness standard allowed the trial court to
consider whether it would have been fair to the State and Angela to admit James's
1 In

the context of out-of-court statements, the words "reliable" and "trustworthy" are
synonymous. State v. Tulipane, 596 P.2d 695, 696 n. l (Ariz. 1979); see also Utah R.
Evid. 807(a)(l).
11

explanation. Appellee' s Br. 37. The trial court never considered fairness to the State and
Angela, so this claim is irrelevant. In any event, fairness to the State and an alleged
victim are not considerations under Rule 106. The only question is whether the proffered
parts of the statement are "'relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into
context the"' admitted parts. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ,J43. In other words, the question
is whether the proffered parts are necessary for a fair understanding of the admitted parts.
Utah R. Evid. 106. The State "'opened the door"' for James's explanation to come in
when it unfairly tried to prove its case against him by taking his words out of context.

Keith, 618 A.2d at 293; see also People v. Melillo, 25 P.3d 769, 775 (Colo. 2001) ("[T]he
rule of completeness is similar to the concept of 'opening the door,' which is also based
on principles of fairness and completeness."). It is unfair for the State to cherry-pick a
defendant's words. There is nothing unfair in preventing the State from doing it. If the
State didn't want the jury to see James's explanation, it shouldn't have introduced his
admission.
The State suggests that James seeks to "'thwart hearsay rules and admit his entire
statement without being subject to cross-examination."' Appellee's Br. 34. To reiterate,
Rule 106 is a hearsay exception. See supra Part I.A. And James does not seek to present
his entire statement to Reyes. See Appellant's Br. 14-15. He seeks only to present his
explanation for why he assaulted Angela, as it is "'relevant and necessary to qualify,
explain, and place into context"' his admission to the assault. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368,
143.

12

In sum, James's explanation was relevant to his theory of extreme emotional
distress and it was necessary to qualify, explain, and place into context his admission.
Thus, the explanation and admission "in fairness" ought to have been "considered at the
same time." Utah R. Evid. 106. Therefore, the trial court erred when it excluded James's
explanation under Rule 106.
C. The trial court's erroneous exclusion ofJames 's explanation was prejudicial
because it precluded James from presenting his theory of the case.
James's opening brief explains that the trial court's erroneous exclusion of his
explanation deprived him of his due process right to present a complete defense, so the
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prejudice standard applies. Appellant's Br. 17-20.
The State contends that the erroneous exclusion did not deprive James of his right to
@

present a defense because he could have testified at trial. Appellee's Br. 24-28. But, as
explained, the trial court erroneously ruled that Angela's statements about cheating on
James were inadmissible hearsay. 2 Appellant's Br. 8-9; R.750:6 (trial court ruling that
James's explanation, which contained Angela's statement about cheating on him with his
brother, constituted "double hearsay, none of which falls under an exception"). An
extreme emotional distress defense requires "extreme emotional distress for which there
is a reasonable explanation or excuse." Utah Code §76-5-205.S(l){b) (emphasis added).

~

Although James may have been able to testify to his belief that Angela was cheating on
him, the trial court's erroneous exclusion of Angela's statement precluded James from
2

As the opening brief explains, Angela's statements weren't inadmissible hearsay
because they weren't hearsay at all. Appellant's Br. 8-9. They were not offered to show
that Angela was cheating on James; they were only offered to show why James believed
she was cheating on him. Appellant's Br. 8-9.
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testifying about the "reasonable explanation" for his belief. See id. Consequently, James
could not have presented a complete extreme emotional distress defense even if he had
testified. The trial court's erroneous ruling deprived James of the ability to present his
theory regardless of whether he had taken the stand. 3
Hence, the State is wrong that this case is like Cruz-Meza. Appellee's Br. 25-27.

Cruz-Meza held that the defendant's right to present a complete defense was not violated
by an evidentiary exclusion where the defendant could have taken the stand and
presented his theory of the case through his testimony. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,r,rl6-17.
But here, as explained, the trial court's erroneous ruling that Angela's statement was
inadmissible hearsay precluded James from testifying to his theory of the case. So, Cruz-

Meza is inapposite. Rather, this case is like McCullar, where this Court held that the trial
court's erroneous exclusion of out-of-court statements violated the defendant's right to
present a defense. State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, ,r,r53-59, 335 P.3d 900, cert.

denied, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2015). Thus, the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard applies. But regardless of the applicable prejudice standard, the trial court's
error was prejudicial. Appellant's Br. 17-20.
The State claims that there is no prejudice because James would not have been
entitled to a jury instruction on extreme emotional distress even without the trial court's
error. Appellee's Br. 43-45. The State misapprehends a defendant's "'relatively low"'
burden for obtaining an instruction on extreme emotional distress. Ross v. State, 2012 UT

3

Indeed, it's likely that James opted not to testify precisely because the trial court's
erroneous ruling would have prevented him from testifying to his theory of the case.
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93, iJ29, 293 P.3d 345. A trial court must give an instruction on extreme emotional
distress if "a rational jury could find a factual basis in the evidence to support the
defense." State v. White, 2011 UT 21, iJ22, 251 P.3d 820; see also State v. Campos, 2013
UT App 213, iJ29, 309 P.3d 1160 ('"Each party is ... entitled to have the jury instructed
on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any reasonable basis in the
evidence to justify it."'). In making this determination, the trial court must "'view the
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
defense."' State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, iJl0, 152 P.3d 315, abrogated on other grounds
@

by State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, iJ39, 349 P.3d 712. The court must not concern itself with
"questions of credibility and choices between differing versions of the facts," for they
"belong properly to the jury." State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984).
Without the erroneous exclusion of James's explanation, James would have been
entitled to an extreme emotional distress instruction. A reasonable jury could have
believed James's explanation for the assault and found that he committed it "under the
influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse." Utah Code §76-5-205.5{l)(b); State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, iJ13, 63 P.3d 94;

Ross, 2012 UT 93, iJ33; cf Spillers, 2007 UT 13, iJ16; Campos, 2013 UT App 213, iJ32.
Indeed, there was no evidence, let alone overwhelming evidence, that contradicted
James's version of events. Cf State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, iJiJ24-25, 61 P.3d 1019.
Furthermore, there is a reasonable probability-and therefore a reasonable
G!}

doubt-that without the erroneous exclusion of James' s explanation, the jury would have
convicted James of manslaughter instead of murder. Appellant's Br. 19-20. The State
15

says no reasonable jury would have found that James acted under the influence of
extreme emotional distress in light of the length and severity of James' s assault on
Angela. Appellee's Br. 45. But the jury could have reasonably interpreted the length and
severity of the assault to support a finding that James acted under extreme emotional
distress. See Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,rl3. Extreme behavior bespeaks extreme emotion.

See White, 2011 UT 21, ,r26. In any event, the evidence was wholly consistent with
James's extreme emotional distress theory. See id. 4
Echoing the trial judge, the State speculates that the admission of James's
explanation would have opened the door to evidence of James's prior assault on Angela.
Appellee's Br. 46. This was never litigated in the trial court and it is certainly subject to
dispute. The State never explains how James's explanation would have opened the door
to evidence of the prior assault, and the trial judge never did, either. All that is required
for extreme emotional distress is that the defendant acted "under the influence of extreme
emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." Utah Code
§76-5-205.5(l)(b). It is hard to see how the prior assault could show that James did not
have an extreme emotional reaction to discovering that his lover was cheating on him
with his brother. Furthermore, the State never provided the requisite "reasonable notice"
that it intended to introduce evidence of the prior assault to rebut James's explanation.

See Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (requiring "reasonable notice" to the defendant if the State

4

Twice the State falsely claims that it took six hours for James to come out of Roger's
house after the police arrived. Appellee's Br. 17, 45. In truth, as the State's own fact
section recognizes, it took approximately three and a half hours. Appellant's Br. 4;
Appellee's Br. 8.
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intends to introduce prior act evidence). During trial, the prosecutor said he intended to
introduce the prior assault only if the defense put on unexpected evidence that brought
the identity of Angela's assailant or James's character into question. R.748:18-19. The
record shows the prosecutor was expecting the defense to proffer James's explanation.
R.300-02. Thus, it is doubtful that the admission of James's explanation would have
allowed the State to introduce evidence of the prior assault. 5
Even if the prior assault had come in, there is still a reasonable probability that the
jury would have found that James acted under the influence of extreme emotional
distress. First, discovering that a lover has been unfaithful is the "paradigmatic" extreme
emotional distress scenario. Baze v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310,325 (6th Cir. 2004). In this
case, James not only discovered that Angela was unfaithful, he also discovered that her
paramour was his brother. This kind of double betrayal would cause anyone to have an
extreme emotional response. See White, 2011 UT 21, if26. Second, the prior assault is
consistent with James acting under extreme emotional distress in this case. It doesn't
show that James did not have an extreme emotional reaction to learning that his lover was
cheating on him with his brother. Third, the assault in this case was far longer and more
severe than the prior assault-indeed, it resulted in Angela's death-indicating that

5

It seems inappropriate for a trial judge to exclude a party's proffered evidence and then
sua sponte declare that the excluded evidence would have opened the door to other
evidence that would have undercut the proffering party's case. Given the exclusion, the
door-opening issue is moot. And it's unfair for a judge to make such a declarationwhich is something like a conditional ruling-without input from the parties. The only
conceivable reason a judge would have to make such a declaration is to attempt to
insulate him or herself from reversal on appeal. In the interests of fairness, appellate
courts ought not consider such sua sponte moot declarations by trial judges.
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James was under the influence of unusual emotional distress. Thus, even if evidence of
the prior assault had been admitted, there is still a reasonable likelihood the jury would
have found that James acted under extreme emotional distress this time.
For reasons given above and in the opening brief, the erroneous exclusion of
James's explanation was prejudicial.
II. The evidence was insufficient to support James's conviction for obstructing
justice because no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that James concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence specifically
intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder.

James' s opening brief explains that the evidence supporting his obstructing justice
conviction suffers from a fatal timing problem. Appellant's Br. 28-30. Specifically, in
order for the jury to reasonably infer that James altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed
evidence specifically intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder, the State
needed to produce evidence that James altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed
evidence after Angela died. Appellant's Br. 28-30. But the State failed to produce any
such evidence, so the jury could not reasonably infer the requisite specific intent.
Appellant's Br. 28-30.
The State counters that the jury could reasonably infer that, at some point, James
realized that he had killed Angela, perhaps even before she actually died. Appellee's Br.
50-51. Even if this is true, it does not solve the State's timing problem. The State still
needed to produce some evidence that James altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed
evidence after he realized that he had killed Angela. But the State points to no such
evidence on appeal, and it didn't present any at trial.
18

Although the State never made the argument at trial, on appeal it suggests that
James's obstructing justice conviction could be based on the evidence that Angela's arm
was elevated off the ground after rigor mortis had set in. Appellee's Br. 49, 52. But the
State produced no evidence of the circumstances in which her arm became elevated.
Thus, there was no evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that James raised
her arm with the specific intent to hinder the investigation of her murder. Furthermore,
there are many more plausible explanations for Angela's elevated arm. For example,
James fell asleep next to Angela after asphyxiating her with his forearm, but he didn't
lmow she was dead. When he awoke, he may have lifted her arm in an attempt to wake
her up. See R.749:91-92 (Reyes testifying that James said he tried "to arouse [Angela] or
awaken her" after he awoke but before he called Roger). Or perhaps Angela's elevated
arm was the result of a cadaveric spasm, "a state where muscles or group of muscle,
instead of going under primary relaxation after death, go into a sudden state of
stiffening." Rajesh Bardale, Principles ofForensic Medicine and Toxicology 150 (2011).
The cause of cadaveric spasms "is not lmown" but they are "usually associated with
violent deaths coupled with emotional disturbances at the time of death." Id. A cadaveric
spasm "continues through the stage of rigor mortis of the body and disappears with the
onset of secondary relaxation." Id. In short, the State needed to produce some evidence
that James moved Angela's arm with the specific intent to hinder the investigation of her
murder. It failed. 6

The State also suggests that James committed obstruction of justice by "call[ing] the
police anonymously." Appellee's Br. 53. This suggestion is plainly absurd. Calling the

6
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The State is correct that "[k]now ledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be
inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying
circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ,i10, 988 P.2d 949; Appellee's Br.
52. "But there should be some facts or circumstances from which an inference can
logically be drawn before the defendant can be required to mount a defense and prove his
lack of knowledge or intent." Id. "[T]he evidence must be clear enough that the jury does
not have to guess." State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 569 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In this
case, the State failed to produce evidence of facts or circumstances from which the jury
could reasonably infer that James altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed evidence
specifically intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above and in the opening brief, James asks the Court to
reverse his conviction for murder and remand for a new trial on that charge. He further
asks the Court to reverse his conviction for obstructing justice and dismiss that charge for
insufficient evidence.
I\~

SUBMITTED this J;I_ day of July, 2015.
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~~LIMPTON

Attorney for Appellant
police to give a truthful report, even if anonymously, cannot reasonably be construed to
constitute altering, destroying, concealing, or removing evidence. And no one gives a
truthful rep011 to police with the intent to hinder an investigation. A person does not
commit obstruction of justice merely by not turning himself in immediately after
committing a crime.
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